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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether or not the Vehicle Registration Ordinance

of Logan City, § 10.56.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan
City under which the defendant was charged is Unconstitutional?
2.

Whether or not the defendant was placed twice in

jeopardy for the same offense by being tried twice for the
same offense of No Utah Registration in violation of the Utah
and the United States Constitution?
3.

Whether or not the statutes under Utah's Motor Vehicle

Act are unconstitutionally vague in violation of Due Process of
Law?
4.

Whether or not the statutes under Utah's Seat Belt

Usage Act are unconstitutional and violate the provisions of
Article I § 24 of the Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
DETERMINATIVE LAWS
§ 10.56.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City,
(See addendum).
§ 10.04.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City,
(See Addendum).
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Utah Code Annotated, § 4]-]-]8, (1953 as amended),
(See Addendum).
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-1-19, (1953 as amended),
(See addendum).
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-1-1, (1953 as amended),
(See addendum).
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-182, (1953 as amended),
(See addendum).
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-183, (1953 as amended),
(See addendum).
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-184, (1953 as amended),
(See addendum).
Utah Code Annotated, § 76-1-403, (1953 as amended),
(See Addendum).
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution (See addendum).
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution (See addendum).
Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution (See addendum).
Fifth Amendment to the Uni ted States Constitution,
(See addendum).
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
(See addendum) «,
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant was charged by Information filed on the
27th day of October, ]989 in the First Circuit Court of the
State of Utah, County of Cache, Logan City Department for the
three offenses of:

Count I of No Utah Registration; Count II

of Failure to Signal to Turn; and Count III of Driver not Wearing a Seat Belt,. (R. 73-74 ) .
The defendant was tried for said offenses in .a jury
trial held before the Honorable Clint S. Judkins on the 20th
day of December, 1989.
Officer Greg Monroe testified on behalf of Logan City
that he was on duty as a Logan City Police Officer on the 8th
day of August, 3 989.

He was stopped at a traffic semaphore

facing north at the intersection of 100 West and 400 North in
Logan, Utah.

He observed the defendant in the turning lane

facing West on 400 North and 100 West.

He then observed the

defendant make a left hand turn and proceed South on 100 West.
Officer Monroe subsequently made a U-turn and stopped the defendant who was driving West on 300 North between 200 West and
300 West.

During the stop, he issued the defendant a citation

for No Utah Registration; Not making a Left Hand Turn Signal;
and Driver Not Wearing a Seat Belt (R. 80).
Officer Monroe further testifed that defendant's vehicle
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was registered in the State of Idaho and that the registration
did not expire until the 31st day of December, 1989.

Officer

Monroe stated that a Cache County Deputy Sheriff was following him in a Sheriff!s vehicle on 100 West, and was involved
in stopping the defendant.

The Cache County Deputy Sheriff

did not testify at the trial.
The defendant testified on his own behalf. He testified
that Officer Monroe was not stopped at the traffic semaphore
when he made a left hand turn at the intersection of 400 North
and 100 West in Logan, Utah.

He testified that he made a

mechanical left hand turn signal when turning left at the
intersection.

He observed Officer Monroe's police vehicle

after he made the turn and that Officer Monroe was driving
North between 300 North and 400 North on 100 West.
The defendant testified that he considered himself to
be a resident of the State of Idaho and residing in Preston,
Idaho.

He stated that he worked at Logan Manufacturing in

Logan, Utah and that because his privilege to operate a motor
vehicle in the State of Utah had been suspended until July 3,
1989 he also maintained an apartment in Logan, Utah for work
purposes for the period between May 2, 1989 and August 8, 1989.
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He had a valid Utah Driver's License on August 8, 1989.

The

jury returned a verdict of not guilty for the offense of not
making a left hand turn signal and guilty for the offenses of
No Utah Registration and Driver not Wearing a Seat Belt.
Subsequent to Officer Monroe and the defendant testifying,
the defendant's attorney moved the Court for dismissal of the
charge of No Utah Registration on the basis that the vehicle
registration ordinance of Logan City was unconstitutional.
ir ial Court denied the motion.

The-

Logan City terminated its pro-

secution under the ordinance and filed an Amended Information
and continued the prosecution under another ordinance incorporating
by reference the State statute, (R. 27-33, R. 66-69).

The de-

fendant's attorney then moved for dismissal of the charge of
Driver not Wearing a Seat Belt on the basis that the Logan City
Ordinance incorporating by reference the State statute for the
offense was unconstitutional.

The Trial Court denied the Motion

(R. 27-33).
The defendant subsequently filed a motion and supplemental
motion for an arrest of judgment on the basis that the statutes
under Utah Motor Vehicle Act and Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Usage
Act are unconstitutional (R. 64-65, 19-25).

Logan City filed

written response to both motions (R. 16-18, 62-63).
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The Trial

Court by Memorandum Decision denied both motions (R. 14-15,
26).
The defendant was sentenced for both offenses on the
30th day of January, 1990.

He was ordered to pay a total

fine of $ 45.00 for both offenses, $ 15.00 to be suspended
upon proof of registration (R. 13). The defendant thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 10-11).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

THE LOGAN CITY VEHICLE REGISTRATION ORDINANCE
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

2.

THE DEFENDANT WAS PLACED TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR
THE SAME OFFENSE OF NO UTAH REGISTRATION.

3.

THE STATUTES UNDER UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE ACT
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.

4.

THE STATUTES UNDER UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE SEAT
BELT USAGE ACT ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOGAN CITY VEHICLE REGISTRATION ORDINANCE IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The defendant contends that Logan City's Vehicle
Registration ordinance is unconstitutional.

§ 10*56.010

of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City provides as follows:

_7_

ARTICLE I. REGISTRATION
10.56.010 Vehicles. Every vehicle, at all times while
being driven, stopped or parked upon the streets or
alleys of the city, shall be registered in the name of
the owner thereof in accordance with the laws of the
state, unless such vehicle is not required by the laws
of the state to be registered in this state, and shall
display in proper position valid and unexpired registration
plates or indicia of registration meeting the requirements
of the laws of the state, clear and distinct and free from
defacement, mutilation, grease and other obscuring matter,
so as to be plainly visible and legible at all times;
provided, however, if such vehicle is not required to be
registered in this state, territory, possession or district
of the United States or a foreign country, substantially
complying with the provisions of this chapter, shall be
considered as compliance with this title.
The defendant's attorney after all the evidence had been
presented to the Court at trial moved the Court for dismissal
of the charge of No Utah Registration because the above ordinance
makes criminal, activities in which the State statute for the
same offense does not contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530 (1976), (R. 31-32
Page 5 & 6 of Clerk's Minutes).
The State statute for the same offense provides as follows:
U.C.A. § 41-1-18 (1953 as amended) provides:
(1) It is a class B misdemeanor for any person to
drive or move or for an owner knowingly to permit
to be driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle
of a type required to be registered in this State:
The Logan City ordinance in this case makes it criminal
to stop or park upon any alley whether public or private a
vehicle required to be registered in this State and the State
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statute for this same offense does not make these activities
criminal.
Logan City Council exceeded its authority under
Utah's Constitution when enacting the provisions of §
10.56.010 of the Revised Ordinance of Logan City and the
ordinace should be declared unconstitutional under the
principles of Allgood v. Larson, supra.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT WAS PLACED TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR
THE SAME OFFENSE OF NO UTAH REGISTRATION.
The defendant contends that he was twice placed in
jeopardy for the same offense of No Utah Registration in
violation of Article I, § 12 and Article I, § 7 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
The defendant was charged by Information for the offense
of No Utah Registration in violation of § 10.56.010 of the
Revised Ordinances of Logan City.

Subsequent to the jury

being impanelled and sworn and Officer Monroe and the
defendant had testified, the defendant's attorney moved the
Court for dismissal of the No Utah Registration charge
upon the grounds that the ordinance was unconstitutional,
(R. 31-32, Page 5 & 6 of the Clerk's Minutes).

The Court

denied the motion and Logan City terminated its prosecution
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under § 10.56.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City,
the filed an Amended Information with the Court (R. 66-69,
R. 30, Page 4 of the Clerk's Minutes) and proceeded with its
prosecution under § 10.04.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan
City incorporating by reference, U.C.A. § 41-1-18 (1953 as
amended).
§ 10.04.03 0 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City
provides as follows:
10.04.010 Statutes adopted. All of UCA 41-1, 41-2,
41-6, 41-7, 41-8, 41-]2(a), 41-21 and 41-22, as amended,
together with all amendments and additions that may
hereafter be made, are enacted, approved and adopted as
part of this section to form the traffic code for this
municipality, except as hereinafter specified, and by
this reference are made a part of this title to the same
extent and effect as though such code were copied in
this chapter in full. Three copies of the laws adopted
by reference shall be filed for use and examination in the
office of city recorder.
U.C.A. § 41-1-18, (1953 as amended) provides as follows:
(1) It is a class B misdemeanor for any person to
drive or move or for an owner knowingly to permit
to be driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle
of a type required to be registered in this State:
U.C.A. § 77-1-5, (1953 as amended) provides as follows:
A criminal action for any violation of a state statute
shall be prosecuted in the name of the state of Utah.
A criminal action for violation of any county or
municipal ordinance shall be prosecuted in the name of
the governmental entity involved.
It is the defendant's contention that he was tried twice
for the same offense of No Utah Registration.
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First, he was

prosecuted under § 10.56.010 of the Revised Ordinances
of Logan City which was improperly terminated by Logan
City.

After terminating this prosecution, Logan City Amended

the Information and prosecuted the defendant under § 10.04.010
of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City incorporating by
reference U.C.A. § 41-1-18, (1953 as amended) in which the
jury found the defendant guilty.
The defendant contends that the second prosecution of
the defendant for the offense of No Utah Registration by
Logan City under § 10.04.010 of the Revised Ordinances of
Logan City was barred by U.C.A. § 76-1-403, (1953 as amended).
The defendant further contends that the second prosecution of the defendant for the offense of No Utah Registration by Logan City under § 10.04.010 of the Revised Ordinances
of Logan City violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, Waller v. Florida, 397
U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970).
This issue was not raised in the Trial Court.

This

Court has previously held that an issue may be raised for
the first time on appeal if the issue affected the substantial
rights of the defendant, State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043,
(Utah App. 1987).

The defendant being tried twice for the

same offense of No Utah Registration by Logan City affected
defendant's substantial rights to Due Process of Law.
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The Information filed with the Court on the 27th day
of October, 1989 did not have any reference to U.C.A. § 41-118, (1953 as amended).

Logan City had every opportunity to

Amend the Information prior to the jury being impanelled and
sworn but waited until all the evidence had been introduced
at trial.

Logan City dismissed the charge of No Utah Registra-

tion by terminating its proseuction under § 10.56.010 of the
Revised Ordinances of Logan City.

Logan City was barred under

the provisions of Rule 25 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure in prosecuting the defendant for No Utah Registration
in violation of § 10.04.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan
City Incorporating by reference U.C.A. § 41-1-18, (1953 as amended).
The defendant was placed twice in jeopardy by being tried
twice for the same of offense of No Utah Registration in violation of the Utah and United States Constitution.

The con-

viction for No Utah Registration should therefore be reversed.
POINT III
THE STATUTES UNDER UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE ACT ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
The? defendant in this case was charged by Amended Information (R.- 66-69) for violating the provisions of § 10.04.010
of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City incorporating by reference U.C.A. § 41-1-18, (1953 as amended) which provides as
follows:

-12-

(1) It is a class B misdemeanor for any person
to drive or move or for an owner knowingly to
permit to be driven or moved upon any highway
any vehicle of a type required to be registered
in this State:
The exceptions of vehicles required to be registered
in the State of Utah is defined under the provisions of
U.C.A. § 41-1-19, (1953 as amended) in which the pertinent
part states as follows:
(1) Every motor vehicle, combination of vehicles,
trailer, and simitrailer, when driven or moved upon
a highway, is subject to the registration and
certificate of title provisions of this chapter except:
(f) any motor vehicle not designed, used or maintained
for the transportation of passengers for hire or for
the transportation of property, if the vehicle is duly
registered in another state and is owned and operated
by a nonresident of this state;
The term of "nonresident" for the purpose of required
vehicle registration under the Motor Vehicle Act is defined
under the provisions of U.C.A. § 41-1-1, (1953 as amended)
of which the pertinent part states as follows:
(22) (a) "Nonresident" means every person who is
not a resident of this state and who does not engage
in intrastate business within this state and operate
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in that business any motor vehicle, trailer,
or simitrailer within this state.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Blowers,
717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986) held that a criminal statute must
be sufficiently clear and definite to inform persons of ordinary intelligence what their conduct must be to conform
to its requirements and to advise one accused of violating it
what constitutes the offense with which he is charged.

See

also, State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d (Utah 1975) and State v.
Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Utah 1981).
It is defendant's contention that Utahfs Motor Vehicle
Act does not give a clear legal definition for the term "Nonresident" and the standards for the residency requirements for
the purpose of required motor vehicle registration.

The Utah

Legislature had enacted statutes which give a clear legal
definition for the standards of the residency requirements
for the purpose of voter registration, U.C.A. § 20-2-13, &
U.C.A. § 20-2-14, (1953 as amended); for the purpose of student
tuition payment fees, U.C.A. § 53B-8-102, (1953 as amended);
for the purpose of receiving public assistance, U.C.A.
§ 62A-9-115, (1953 as amended); and also for the purpose of
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receiving a notarial commission, U.C.A. § 46-1-3,
(1953 as amended).

However, the Utah Legislature under

Utah's Motor Vehicle Act which imposes criminal penalties
has failed to enact a statute which gives a clear and
definite definition of the term of "Nonresident" and
the residency requirements for the purpose of required
motor vehicle registrations.
Furthermore, the challenged statutes are unconstitutional because the statutes attempts to delegate legislative power to the judiciary.

In People v. Latsis,195

Colo. 411, 414, 578 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1978) and again in
People v. Smith, 638 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1981), the Colorado
Court stated:
Due Process of Law requires that the legislature
provide sufficiently precise standards to guide
a judge and jury in deciding whether a crime has
been committed. Failure to do so may well constitute
an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
The power to define crimes is legislative in
character, it may not be delegated to the judiciary.
16 CoJ.S. Constitutional Law, § 159.

See,

A statute which

delegates legislative power to the judiciary violates •
a constitutional mandate for separation of powers.
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State

v. Smith, 183 Conn. 17, 438 A.2d 1165 (Conn. 1981).
The statutes challenged in the instant case delegates
to the judiciary the power to legislate the standards for the
residency requirements under Utah's Motor Vehicle Act in each
individual case.
The Court in Kelm v. Carlson, 473 F.2d 1267, 1271, (Sixth
Cir. 1973) held that the word "resident" has many different
meanings in law, largely determined by the statutory context
in which it is used.
The Court in United States v. Calhoun, 566 F.2d 969, 973
(Fifth Cir. 1978) held that a person's legal residence is the
permanent place of abode which person intends to be his residence
and to which he intends to return despite temporary residence
elsewhere or despite temporary absences.
The defendant testified that he considered himself to be
a resident of the State of Idaho ctespitcs his temporary absence
and temporary residence in the State of Utah (R. 29).
Logan City contended in the Trial Court that because the
defendant had a Utah Driver's License on August 8, 1989 that he
was a resident of the State of Utah.

However, Utah's Operator's

License Act, U.C.A. § 41-2-102 (16), (1953 as amended) can be
construed to require any person who resides in Preston, Idaho
and travels or sojourns the 25 miles to Logan, Utah for employ-
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ment purposes must have a valid Utah Driverfs License.
There are perhaps many valid arguments as to whether
the defendant was or was not a resident of the State of
Utah which demonstrates the vagueness of the statutes
challenged by defendant.

The statutes ar.e vague both on

their face and as applied to defendant and therefore violate
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

The defendant's conviction for No Utah

Registration should therefore be reversed.
POINT IV
THE STATUTES UNDER UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE SEAT
BELT USAGE ACT ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The defendant contends that the statutes under Utah's
Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Usage Act, U.C.A. § 41-6-182 et seq.
(1953 as amended) violate the provisions of Article I, § 24
of the Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The defendant was charged by Information (R. 73-74,
66-69) for violating the provisions of § 10.04.010 of the
Revised Ordinances of Logan City incorporating by reference
U.C.A. § 41-6-182 (1953 as amended) which reads as follows:
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(1) Except as provided in Section 41-6-148.20
for children under five years of age and except
as provided in Subsection (2) for passengers
who are at least five years of age but younger
than 18 years of age, the driver and front
seat passengers of a motor vehicle as defined
in Subsection 41-6-148.20(1), operated on a
street or highway in this state shall wear a
properly adjusted and fastened safety belt
system, which meets standards promulgated by
the Department of Public Safety.
(2) The driver of a motor vehicle shall secure
or cause to be secured a properly adjusted and
fastened safety seat belt system on any passenger
in the front seat who is at least five years of
age but younger than 18 years of age.
The appellant contends that the enforcement of
§ 41-6-182 against him subjected him to arbitrary and
invidious discrimination because the provisions of
§ 41-6-183 (1953 as amended) excludes the following
class of people from its operation:
This part [article] does not apply to a driver
or front seat passenger of:
(5) a motor vehicle engaged in pick up, delivery,
or service operations involving repeated starts
and stops and requiring the fr.ont seat occupant
to frequently, and repeatedly enter and leave
the vehicle.
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The appellant further contends that the enforcement of § 41-6-182 against him subjected him to arbitrary
and invidious discrimination because the provisions of U.C.A.
§ 41-6-184 (1953 as amended) excludes the following
class of people from its operation:.
Enforcement of this part [article] by state or
local law enforcement agents shall be only a
secondary action when a driver of a motor vehicle
has been detained for a suspected violation of
Title 41 other than this part, or another offense.
Article I § 24 of the Utah Constitution provides
that:

All laws of a general nature shall have uniform

operation.
It is clear that the above statutory provisions
violate this constiutional mandate.

The Utah Supreme

Court under the provisions of Article I § 24 of the Utah
Constitution held a Sunday closing ordinance to be unconstitutional as being arbitrarily discriminatory, Gronlund
v. Salt Lake City, 194 P.2d 464 (1948).

The Court in

Dodge Town, Inc., v. Romney, 25 U.2d 267, 480 P.2d 461
(1971) held a statute prohibiting Sunday sales of new or
used automobiles by licensed dealers to be unreasonably
discriminatory against licensed auto dealers.

The Court

in Johnston v. Stoker, 685 P.2d 539 (Utah 1984) and
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Ma Ian v. Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661 (Utah 1984) held that
Utah's guest statutes violated the equal protection
principles of the above section of the Utah Constitution.

The Court in Justice v. Standard Gilsonite

Co., 12 U.2d 357, 366 P.2d 974 (Utah 1961) held that
a wage payment statute which excluded banks and
mercantile houses from the penalty provisions of the
statute to be an unreasonable classification with no
reasonable justification and therefore unconsti tutional.
In the instant case there is no reasonable
justification to exclude from the operation of § 41-6-182
a driver or front seat passenger of a motor vehicle
engaged in pick up, delivery, or service operations
involving repeated starts and stops and requiring
the front seat occupant to frequently and repeatedly
enter and leave the vehicle.
An ordinary person who is not a professional
or commercial driver may during their normal day to
day activities be required to make repeated starts
and stops requiring them to frequently and repeatedly
enter and leave their vehicle.
situated.

-20-

They are all similarly

There is no reasonable justification to exclude
from the operation of § 41-6-182 a driver or front
seat passenger when the driver is not detained for
a suspected violation of- Title 41 other than § 41-6-182
or another offense.
A peace officer can observe someone driving down
a street or highway with part of their seat belt system
hanging out the door.

The provisions of § 41-6-184

precludes the officer from enforcing § 41-6-182.

How-

ever, if a peace officer detains a driver for a speeding violation and observes a seat belt violation then
the peace officer can enforce § 41-6-182.

Both drivers

are similarly situated by not wearing their seat belt,
but § 41-6-184 allows only the driver who was speeding
to be cited for not wearing a seat belt and fined.
Clearly, this is an unreasonable classification without
any reasonable justification.
The United States Supreme Court in Rinaldi v.
Yaeqer, 384 U.S. 305, 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 86 S.Ct. 1497
(1966) and again in James, Judicial Administrator v.
Strange, 407 U.S» 128°, 32 L.Ed.2d 600, 92 S.Ct. 2027
(1972) held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes a
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requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class
singled out.
There is no rationality in the nature of the class
singled out for enforcement of the statutes challenged in
this case.

The statutory scheme may encourage some overly

zealous law enforcement officers to issue unwarranted citations
for other offenses just to cite a person for not wearing a
seat belt.

The statutes under Utah's Motor Vehicle Seat Belt

Usage Act are arbitrary and discriminatory in violation of
Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

The defendant's conviction for Not

Wearing a Seat Belt should therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The defendant respectfully submits that based upon the
foregoing his convictions for No Utah Registration and for Not
Wearing a Seat Belt should be reversed by this Court and remanded to the Lower Court for further proceedings consistent
with this Court's decision-.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this

/

day of August, 1990.

DAVID CRAIG CARLSESf
Appellant in Pro Se
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ARTICLE I,

REGISTRATION

10.56,010 Vehicles, Every vehicle, at all times while
being driven, stopped or parked upon the streets or alleys
of the city, shall be registered in the name of the owner
thereof in accordance with the laws of the state, unless
such vehicle is not required by the laws of the state to be
registered in this state, and shall display in proper position valid and unexpired registration plates or indicia of
registration meeting the requirements of the laws of the
state, clear and distinct and free from defacement, mutilation, grease and other obscuring matter, so as to be plainly
visible and legible at all times; provided, however, if such
vehicle is not required to be registered in this state, the
indicia of registration issued by another state, territory,
possession or district of the United States or a foreign
country, substantially complying with the provisions of this
chapter, shall be considered as compliance with this title.
(Prior code §42-15-36)
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Chapter 10.04
STATUTES ADOPTED
Sections:
10.04.010

Statutes adopted.

10.04.010 Statutes adopted. All of UCA 41-1, 41-2,
41-6, 41-7, 41-8, 41-12(a), 41-21 and 41-22, as amended,
together with all amendments and additions that may hereafter be made, are enacted, approved and adopted as part of
this section to form the traffic code for this municipality,
except as hereinafter specified, and by this reference are
**de a part of this title to the same extent and effect as
though such code were copied in this chapter in full. Three
copies of the laws adopted by reference shall be filed for
.We and examination in the office of^the city recorder.
lAdded during 1989 codification)

ARTICLE 3

ORIGINAL AND RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION,
ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
41-1-18. Driving without registration or certificate of title
— Penalty — Temporary permit.
(1) It is a class B misdemeanor for any person to drive or move or for an
owner knowingly to permit to be driven or moved upon any highway any
vehicle of a type required to be registered in this state:
(a) which is not registered or for which a certificate of title has not been
issued or applied for; or
(b) for which the appropriate fee has not been paid as required unless
allowed under Subsection (2).
(2) If an application accompanied by the proper fee has been made in this
state for registration and certificate of title for a vehicle, it may be operated
temporarily, pending complete registration, by displaying a valid temporary
permit or other evidence of the application under rules made by the commission.
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 13; 1937, ch. 65,
§ 1; C. 1943, 57-3a-18; L. 1989, ch- 274, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, inserted the
subsection designations (l)(a) and (b) and (2);

substituted "is a class B misdemeanor" for
"shall be unlawful" at the beginning of Subsection (1); and made numerous stylistic changes,
. Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

41-1-19- Vehicles subject to registration — ExceptionsCD Every motor vehicle, combination of vehicles, trailer, and semitrailer,
when driven or moved upon a highway, is subject to the registration and
certificate of title provisions of this chapter except:
(a) any vehicle driven or moved upon a highway in conformance with
the provisions of this chapter relating to manufacturers, transporters,

41-1-19

MOTOR VEHICLES

dealers, lien holders, or interstate commercial vehicles duly registered id
another state and not owned by a resident of the state or under a tempo-}
rary registration permit issued by the department or dealer as authorizedj
by this chapter;
J
(b) any vehicle driven or moved upon a highway only for the purpose on
crossing the highway from one property to another;
I
(c) any implement of husbandry, whether of a type otherwise subject to
registration or not, which is only incidentally operated or moved upon a
highway;
(d) any special mobile equipment;
(e) no certificate of title need be obtained for any vehicle of a type
subject to registration which is owned by the government of the United
States;
(f) any motor vehicle not designed, used, or maintained for the transportation of passengers for hire or for the transportation of property, if the
motor vehicle is duly registered in another state and is owned and operated by a nonresident of this state;
(g) any vehicle or combination of vehicles designed, used, or maintained for the transportation of persons for hire or for the transportation
of property, if the vehicle or combination of vehicles is duly registered in
another state and is owned and operated by a nonresident of this state,
and if the vehicle or combination of vehicles has a gross laden weight of
26,000 pounds or less or an unladen weight of 7,000 pounds or less;
(h) any trailer of 750 pounds or less unladen weight and not designed,
used, and maintained for the transportation of property or person for hire;
or
(i) any manufactured home or mobile home.
(2) The registration provisions of this chapter do not apply to:
(a) any off-highway vehicle currently registered under Section 41-22-3,

MOTOR VEHICLE ACT

41-1-1

(18) "Manufacturer" means every person engaged in the business of
constructing or assembling vehicles of a type required to be registered at
an established place of business in this state.
(19) "Metal tire" means every tire the surface of which in contact with
the highway is wholly or partially of metal or other hard, nonresilient
material.
(20) "Motor vehicle" means every vehicle which is self-propelled and
every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead
trolley wires, but not operated upon rails.
(21) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle having a saddle for the
use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in
contact with the ground, but excluding a tractor.
(22) (a) "Nonresident" means every person who is not a resident of this
state and who does not engage in intrastate business within this
state and operate in that business any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer within this state.
»
(b) Every person who engages in intrastate business within this
state and operates in that business any motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer in this state or who, even though engaging in interstate
commerce, maintains any vehicle in this state as the home station of
that vehicle is considered a resident of this state, in so far as that
vehicle is concerned in administering this chapter.
(23) "Off-highway implement of husbandry"' is used as defined under
Section 41-22-2.
(24) "Off-highway vehicle" is used as defined under Section 41-22-2.
(25) "Owner" means a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle. In
the event a title reflects the names of two or more persons as coowners in
the alternative by use of the word "or" or "and/r," each coowner is considered to have granted to the other coowners the absolute right to endorse
and deliver title and to dispose of the vehicle. If the title reflects the
names of two or more persons as coowners in the conjunctive by use of the
word "and," or the title does not reflect any alternative or conjunctive
word, the title shall require the endorsement of each coowner to transfer
the vehicle. If a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional
sale or installment sale or mortgage of the vehicle with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and
with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or
mortgagor, or if the vehicle is the subject of a security agreement, then
the conditional vendee, mortgagor, or debtor is considered the owner for
the purposes of this chapter. If a vehicle is the subject of an agreement to
lease, the lessor is considered the owner until the lessee exercises his
option to purchase the vehicle.
(26) "Person" means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation.
(27) "Pneumatic tire" means every tire in which compressed air is designed to support the load.
(28) "Preceding year" means a period of 12 consecutive months fixed by
the department, which is within 16 months immediately preceding the
commencement of the registration or license year in which proportional
registration is sought. The department in fixing the period shall conform
47

OPERATORS' LICENSE ACT

41-2-102

not operated upon rails, except motorized wheel chairs and vehicles
moved solely by human power.
(15) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle, other than a tractor, having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel with not
more than three wheels in contact with the ground.
(16) "Nonresident" means a person who is not a resident of this state
and who has not sojourned or engaged in any gainful occupation in this
state for an aggregate period of 60 days in the preceding 12 months and
also every person who is temporarily assigned by his employer to work in
Utah.
(17) "Operator" means any person who is in actual physical control of a
vehicle.
(18) "Owner" means a person other than a lienholder having an interest in the property or title to a vehicle. The term includes a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle subject to a security interest in
another person but excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as security.
."
(19) "Person" means every natural person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation.
(20) ^TReportable violation" means an offense required to be reported to
the Driver License Division as determined by the division and includes
those offenses against which points are assessed under Section 41-2-128.
(21) "Revocation" means the termination by action of the division of a
licensee's privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
(22) "School bus" means every publicly or privately owned motor vehicle designed for transporting ten or more passengers and operated for the
transportation of children to or from school or school activities.
(23) "Suspension" means the temporary withdrawal by action of the
division of a licensee's privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
(24) 'Taxicab" means any class D motor vehicle transporting any number of passengers for hire and that is subject to state or federal regulation
as a taxi.
(25) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting
devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
ffistory: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 1; 1935, ch. 47,
§ 2; 1941, ch. 51, § 2; C. 1943, 57-4-3; L. 1951
(1st S.S.), ch. 9, § 1; 1967, ch. 81, § 1; 1983,
ch. 183, § 4; C. 1953, § 41-2-1; renumbered
by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 2; 1987, ch. 136, § 2;
1989, ch. 22, § 23; 1989, ch. 209, § 1; 1989,
ch. 252, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment by Chapter 22, effective April 24, 1989,
substituted "Subsection 41-2-128(4)" for "Section 41-2-19(4)" in Subsection (18).
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 252r effective April 24, 1989, added Subsection (6); redesignated former Subsections (6) to (22) as (7)

to (23); and substituted "41-2-128" foi
"41-2-19(4)" in Subsection (19).
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 209, effective July 1, 1989, deleted the definitions oi
"Class A license," "Common carrier," "Contract carrier," and "Private carrier"; added definitions of "Class D license," "Class M license,'
"Commercial driver license (CDL)," "Commer
cial motor vehicle," "Disqualification," and
"Taxicab"; renumbered the definitions accordingly; and substituted "Subsection 41-2-122
(4)" for "Section 41-2-19 (4)" in Subsection (19)
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
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ARTICLE 17
MOTOR VEHICLE SEAT BELT USAGE
41-6-181. Short title.
This part [article] is known as the "Motor VehicJe Seat Belt Usage Act/'
History: C. 1953, 41-6a-l81, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 186, 5 1.

41-6-182. Driver and front seat passengers.
(1) Except as provided in Section 41-6-148.20 for children under five years
of age and except as provided in Subsection (2) for passengers who are at least
five years of age but younger than 18 years of age, the driver and front seat
passengers of a motor vehicle, as defined in Subsection 41-6-148.20(1), operated on a street or highway in this state shall wear a properly adjusted and
fastened safety belt system, which meets standards promulgated by the Department of Public Safety.
(2) The driver of a motor vehicle shall secure or cause to be secured a
properly adjusted and fastened safety seat belt system on any passenger in the
front seat who is at least five years of age but younger than 18 years of age.

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-183.

41-6-186

Exceptions.

This part [article] does not apply to a driver or front seat passenger of:
(1) a motor vehicle manufactured before July 1, 1966;
(2) a motor vehicle in which the driver or passengers possess a written
verification from a licensed physician that the driver or passenger is
unable to wear a safety seat belt system for physical or medical reasons;
(3) a motor vehicle which is not required to be equipped with a safety
seat belt system under federal law;
(4) a motor vehicle operated by a rural letter carrier of the United
States Postal Service while performing the duties of a rural letter carrier;
or
(5) a motor vehicle engaged in pick up, delivery, or service operations
involving repeated starts and stops and requiring the front seat occupant
to frequently and repeatedly enter and leave the vehicle.
History: C. 1953, 41«6a-183, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 186, § 3.

41-6-184.

Enforcement

Enforcement of this part [article] by state or local law enforcement agents
shaft 6e only as a secondary action when a driver of a motor vehicle has been
detained for a suspected violation of Title 41 other than this part, or another
offense.
History: C. 1953, 41-6a-184, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 186, § 4.

41-6-185. Penalty for violation.
A person who violates Section 41-6-182 shall be fined $10. Points for a
motor vehicle reportable violation, as defined under Section 41-2-1 [41-2-102],
may not be assessed against any person for a violation of Section 41-6-182.
History. C. 1953, 41-6a-185, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 186, § 5; L. 1987, ch. 136, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment in the second sentence substituted

"Points for a motor vehicle reportable violation, a* defined under Section 41-2-1, may not"
for "No motor vehicle moving violation points
may."

76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should
have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution;
and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated: or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not
guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense
is an acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
GENERAL PROVISIONS

76-1-404

(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination
takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal,
and takes place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However,
termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is
necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without
injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-403, e n a c t e d by L.
1973, ch. 196, ii 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, 4 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Conduct constituting single crime.
Severed counts.
Cited.
Conduct constituting single crime.
Retention of stolen property of different individuals is a single act and a single offense
when evidence shows that the items were retained simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen
items were the subject of a previous prosecution for related offenses, a second prosecution

Severed counts.
This section does not mandate dismissal if
counts were properly severed. Thus, where a
magistrate severed counts "to promote justice''
and the district court later refused to rejoin
them for the same reason after defendant had
been convicted on one of the counts, the case
was not one that "should have been tried under
§ 76-1-402." State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Utah
1987).
Cited in State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34

77-1-5, Prosecuting party.
A criminal action for any violation of a state statute shall be prosecuted in
the name of the state of Utah. A criminal action for violation of any county or
municipal ordinance shall be prosecuted in the name of the governmental
entity involved.

Rule 25. Dismissal without trial.
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the
court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party,
order an information or indictment dismissed.
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial;
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any
bill of particulars furnished m support thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be charged in the pleading so filed;
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the
impaneling or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury;
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations.
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and
entered in the minutes.
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable
delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly
alleged in the information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for the
offense shall not be barred and the court may make such orders with respect
to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the
interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged
and bail exonerated.
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to
any other prosecution for the offense charge^.
Rule 25

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may
dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party
The injured party shall first acknowledge the compromise before the court or
in writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and entered m
the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense; provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted
when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in the
performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony.
Cross-References. — Detainers against
prisoners, dismissal of action for failure to
bring to trial, * 77-29-1
Dismissal for failure to find indictment,
> 77-12-2.

Dismissal where evidence not sufficient to
establish offense charged. Rule 17
Right to speedv trial. Utah Const, Art I
Sec 12. * 774-6

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Dismissal of codefendant.
Dismissal order
Good cause for delay.
Magistrate's authority to dismiss.
Offense improperly alleged
Reasonableness of delay
Statutes not in conflict.
Subsequent prosecution

of those cases requested and received psychiatric examination and who was appointed various counsel because of necessity and at his own
request, was not denied right to speedv trial
where he was held sane on August 14 1969
and trial was initially set for January 7, 1970
and commenced on April 3. 1970. after disposition of defendant's motion to dismiss made on
Januarv 7 State v Carlsen 25 Utah 2d 136
478 P2d 326 (1970)

ART. I, § 7

CONSTITUTION or

Gun control laws, validity and construe
tion of, 23 A. L R. T,d 8i3.
Law Reviews.
The Coiibtitutior.nl Kight to Keep and

LTAIT

Bear Arms, Lucilius V. 1 m»M\, 2^ H-r..
L. Kcv. 473.
licsluctious on tic Uiglit To T" -i Aim,
—Slate ,uid Federal Fire.uins Lo£> l.iinMi,
08 U. Pa. L. How 005.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or propeity, without due
process of law.
Comparable Provision.
Montana Coi.st., Art. I l l , §27.

body, or agency autiioiizcd b\ l.iu to detcn.iiiie the questions; (b) _ an i.-quiry
into
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Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Comparable Provision.

—acquittal notwithstanding defect in in-

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Cross-Reference.
Prohibition on private or special laws,
Const., Art. VI, § 26.
In general.
All laws shall operate uniformly where \er uniform laws can be enacted. State
r. Holtgreve, 58 U. 563, 200 P. 894, 26
A. L. R. 696.
Objects and purposes of law present
touchstone for determining proper and
improper classifications. State v. Mason,
94 U. 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A. L. R. 330;
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100
U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
One who assails legislative classification as arbitrary has burden of proving
it to be such. State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
Classification is never unreasonable or
irbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion
features so long as there is some basis for
differentiation between classes or subject
matters included, as compared to those
^eluded, provided differentiation bears
••asonable relation to purposes of act.
>»ate v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100
1. 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
Before legislative enactment can be in>rfered with, court must be able to say
•Hat there is no fair reason for the law
,v
at would not require equallv its exten-

State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100
^L 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
Only where some persons or transactions excluded from operation of law are.
^ to the subject matter of the law, in
no differentiate class from those ineluded in its operation, is the 1 nv
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis to differentiate can be found,
law must be held constitutional. State v.
J. B. k R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116
P. 2d 766.
Inability of legislature to make perfect
classification does not render statute unconstitutional. State v. J. B. & R. E.
Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
Tn determining whether classification
by legislature is unconstitutional,
ma<j0
discrimination is very essence of classification and is not objectionable unless
founded upon unreasonable distinctions,
Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 U. 284,
194 P. 2d 464.
An act is never unconstitutional because of discriminatiou as long as there is
differentiation
s o m e reasonable basis for
between classes which is related to the
purposes to be accomplished by the act,
and it applies uniformly to all persons
within the class. Hansen v. Public Emplovees' Retirement System Board of Ad-

AMENDMENT

III [1791]

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of
the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

AMENDMENT

IV [1791]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable'searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shatt
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and part.cularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

AMENDMENT

V [1791]

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of lifer liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT

XIV [1868]

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several. States according
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age
in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States,
or under any State, who having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all
such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

AMENDMENT

XV [1870]

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
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(CASE

LOGAN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
• STATE OF UTAH
• COUNTY OF CACHE

Nam*

JX.C1TY OF L ^ c Q f i i o

(Last)

3*

Address

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR BEFORE

J&X&-.
Place of Birth

D08

°

1ST CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE .

ON OR BEFORE THE^DAY Qf<*K3<^ , i§&

State

P'icture
i c t u10
r e l O V eVehicle
h i d Color
[JSfrYes C No

(State)

£

(Middle)

k

Vehicle License No.

j Hair

j Eyes

D

COURT.

D

D

D

•

Race

Moa«i v

&L

,
Misd.
Cit.

V5\ V

a

^li

State

% .

Vehicle Year Vehicle Make

t&*==*-

D

^

Phone

(Zip)

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING:
UTAH
COUNTY
CITY

( A ^ y P.M.

IN THE

(Firs!)

m
JA
&y>TL\
i social security Numoer
iMt. j wt.

*

LOCATED AT V " \ O K > . \ P Q I Q

"XMonftr

CITATION NO.

52.v7yyg^ ftY M tew a .

Driver License No.

AT THE HOUR OF ^^OC?

r

UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR

_^kk 45L
A .

^'5L

'6VO

Accident
R
N
Traf.

X
X
>*

Location

i Mite Post No.

VST.
Interstate
(Interstate
I Direction /^—->J
Yes G No
MPH Over

N S-£WJ)

FOR COURT USE ONLY

-

^-,

*-»-

Military Time

Speeding

Date of Conviction/Forfeiture
Fine

Suspended

-Jail

Suspended

Surcharge $
PLEA/FINDING

SEVERITY

G Guilty
D Not Guilty
• Forfeited Bail

D Minimum
Q Intermediate
C Maximum

I CERTIFY THAT COPY OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION WAS DULXSERVED UPON THE
DEFENDANT ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOwpR BELIEVE AND SO
ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENOANT DID COMMIT THE(0FFENSE HEREIN SET
FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT
HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19.
OFFICER.

VW\

COMPLAINANT _
DATE

—MISD. CIT.-BCI—

m

DLO
USE

-WaU&Ui

^ fitf.

TRAFFIC - COURT

g ^ A

ID ^2>jT7.

-CP.^,

L

ID#

fOtt^v^

T-T-

Date Sent to DLD

.33

Docket No.
RIGHT INDEX

*>

"•"N TKZ CIPCUIT COURT STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DERAILMENT
LOGAN CITY,

)
Plaintiff

vs.
CARLSEN, David C.
598 North Main
Logan, Utah
3/5/49

INFORMATION

)

Defendant

vqi*1 tffl

)

The undersigned, CRAIG ANDREWS under oath, states on the
information and belief that the above named Defendant committed the
crime (s) of:
COUNT 1: NO UTAH REGISTRATION (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR)
COUNT 2: FAILURE TO SIGNAL TO TURN (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR)
COUNT 3: DRIVER NOT SEATBELTED (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR)
at Logan, Utah on 8/8/89 in violation of the following sections of the
Revised Ordinances of Logan City:
10.56.010; 10.04.010 incorporating by reference Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended) Sections 41^-6-69 (1), 41-6-182
That, contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's acts
constituting the offense were:
COUNT 1: That the Defendant did drive or permit a motor vehicle to be
driven, stopped or parked on the streets or alleys of the City of Logan
without vehicle displaying in proper position valid and unexpired
registration plates or indication of registration meeting the
requirements of the laws of the State of Utah.
Class B Misdemeanor
COUNT 2: That the Defendant did make a right/left -hand turn without
giving a signal of intention to do so continuously for at least three
(3) seconds proceeding the beginning of the turn. Class B Misdemeanor
COUNT 3: That the Defendant, being the driver or operator of a vehicle
upon the streets of Logan City did fail to secure to cause to be secured
to himself/herself a properly adjusted and fastened safety seat belt
system.
Class B Misdemeanor
This information is based on evidence obtained frcm the following
witnesses:
G. MONROE, LCPD
Authorized for presentment & filing

___
' COMPLAINANT

( J/^ lco*/f $ <^X^^L^z£jP
Logan City" Prosecutor /Attorney^
DAMAGES:

YES

NO

Subscribed & sworn to before ire
this ^y &aY °f O c^/~~
19S~>-

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LXAN CITY DEPARTMENT
LOGAN CITY r

)
AMENDED

Plaintiff
vs.
CARLSEN, David C.
598 North Main
Loganf Utah
3/5/49
Defendant

INFORMATION
)

)

The undersigned, CRAIG ANDREWS under oath, states on the information and
belief that the above named Defendant ccramitted the crime(s) of:
COUNT 1: NO UTAH REGISTRATION. (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR)
OOUNT 2: FAILURE TO SIGNAL TO .TORN (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR)
COUNT 3: DRIVER NOT SEATBECTBD (DETRACTION)
at Logan, Utah on 8/8/89 in violation of the following sections of the
Revised Ordinances of logan City:
10.04.010 incorporating by reference Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
Sections 41-1-18, 41-6-69(1), 41-6-182
That, contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's.acts constituting
the offense were:
COUNT 1: Hiat the Defendant did drive or pennit a motor vehicle to be driven
on the streets of the City of Logan without vehicle displaying in proper
position valid and unexpired registration plates or indication of
registration meeting the requirements of the laws of the State of Utah.
Class B Misdemeanor
OOUNT 2: That the Defendant did turn a vehicle from a direct course when
such movement could not be made with reasonable safety and/or Defendant
turned said vehicle without giving an appropriate signal for at least three
(3) seconds preceeding the beginning of the turn or change.
Class B Misdemeanor
COUNT 3: That the Defendant, being the driver or operator of a vehicle upon
the streets of Logan City did fail to secure or cause to be secured to
himself/herself a properly adjusted and fastened safety seat belt system.
Infraction

Ihis information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
G. MONROE, LCPD
Authorized for presentinent & filing

(L^

iuU^•COMELAINANr

ftA.^/a&uAAdj

Subscribed & swam t o before me

Logan Cxttf Prosecutor/AttorneyDMffiGES:

YES

NO

this

zg/tipyffi f^CcL

l^f

First Circuit Court, State of Utah, County of Cache,
Logan Department
STATE OF UTAH

~Z&GK?rT?r!*f-~
Plaintiff

^)nyijH

JUDGMENT
)

Onc\sr€r\
Defendant

)

Defendant; (havjng
(having been adjudged) (sntegod
(sntoped a plipg
pW of)GUILTY
ofKiUILTY to the
th charge of
Count No.

a Class.

Count No. 2

a Class,

^___

count NO. 3 f)f\ver

[)<Q-f- feqj-belt^cf-

£

a Class.

a Class.
Count No.4 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.Misdemeanor, and no legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be pronounced, and Defendant being
present (with) (having wcrivod) Counsel. It is the judgment and sentence of the Court as follows:
Count No. 1

Defendant is fined $

t*^

plus surcharge of

$

less the following suspended
TOTAL TO BE PAID
and to be imprisoned for
Count No. 2

$

days in the Cache County Jail with
days to be suspended on payment of fine.
Defendant is fined $.
. plus surcharge of
less the following suspended

$.

TOTAL TO BE PAID
and to be imprisoned for

days in the Cache County Jail with

Count No. 3

Defendant is fined $

/U

$

days to be suspended on payment of fine.

plus surcharge of

$

less the following suspended

$.

TOTAL TO BE PAID
and to be imprisoned for

days in the Cache County Jail with

Count No. 4

Defendant is fined $

$.

plus surcharge of

$

less the following suspended

$

. days in the Cache County Jail with.

Stay of Execution to FRIDAY.

Defendant may appeal this judgment within 30 days to Court of Appeal/in Sa

1-3Q-7

Suspend*/

o

^ors

$

days to be suspended on payment of fine.
at 4:30 p.m. and the defendant is

ordered to appear in Court at said time. Fine to be paid in installments of $

TWH

10_

days to be suspended on payment of fine.

TOTAL TO BE PAID
and to be imprisoned for m
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DAVID CRAIG CABLSEN
Defendant in Pro Se
78 \ North 100 East, # 1
Logan, Utah

CIRCUIT COURT L U

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OP UTAH
COUNTY* OP CACHE, LOGAN C H Y DEPAKMEMT

LOGAN CITY,
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR AN ARREST OP
Plaintiff,

JUDCH4EMT

-vsDAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,

Case No,

Defendant*

COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen, and hereby
respectfully moves this Honorable Court for an Order of an Arrest of Judgment
in the above-entitled matter*
The basis for this motion is that the provisions of Section 10.04.010 of
the revised Ordinances of Logan City incorporating by reference Section 41-6-182
U.CJU

(1953 as amended) subjects a person situated as the defendant in this

case to an unreasonable classification without any reasonable justification
in violation of the provisions of Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution
of Utah which requires that All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation, and the statute subjects a person situated as the defendant in this
case to arbitrary and invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Urited States Constitution,
A further basis for this motion is that the defendant has been denied
Due Process of Law as secured under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution because when viewing the evidence adduced at the trial
as a whole in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no reasonable or
prudent person could have found the defendant guilty of the offense of No
Utah Registration beyond a reasonable doubt.
A further basis for this motion is that the evidence adduced at the
trial clearly establishes that Officer Monroe did not have probable cause to
believe that the defendant did not properly make a left hand turn signal and
did not have probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed any
criminal offense when he stopped the defendant on August 8, 1989 and the
evidence otained by Officer Monroe te preaecute the defendant for the offenses
of No Utah Registration and No Seai Belt was tainted and the convictions violate
the doctrine of the Fruits of the Poisnous Tree.

DATED this 21st day of December, 1989.

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN^
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
MAILED a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for an Arrest of
Judgment to Cherl Russell, Logan City Prosecutor, located at 255 North Main,
Logan, Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and by placing the same in a U.S. Mailbox
on this 21st day of December, 1989.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
LDGAN CITY,
Plaintiff

)
)

vs.

]

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN

]>

Defendant

]

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO ARREST
JUDGMENT

case No. flQ2nfiflfiS7

OCMES NCW the Logan City Prosecutor, Cheryl A. Russell, and responds to
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment as follows:
1. " Defendant's motion is unsupported by an affidavit or memorandum to
support his motion to arrest judgment arid is therefore insufficient on its
face.
2.

Defendant's motion fails to set forth hew specifically Logan City

Ordinance 10.04.010 incorporating by reference Section 41-6-182 of Utah Code
makes an unreasonable classification in violation of Article I, Section 24 of
the Utah Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The burden of establishing the same is on the Defendant and he
has failed in his motion herein to establish the same.
3.

Defendant's motion fails likewise to set forth any evidence of a

violation of Due Process of Law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The jury found that the Defendant was guilty of
the offense of No Utah Registration beyond a reasonable doubt.
4.

Although the Defendant was found not guilty of making a left hand

turn by the jury, it does not necessarily follow there was no reason for the
stop. The test for the stop is a reasonable suspicion not probable cause.
See Terry v. Ohio. 392 US 1, 20 L Ed 2d 889, 88 S. Ct 1868 (1968). The later
is for an arrest. Officer Monroe clearly saw the defendant fail to make a
mechanical left turn signal. Furthermore, Defendant was not only cited for
the turn tut also for no Utah Registration as well.

Finally, Defendant

filed to make a motion to suppress the evidence of no Utah registration and
no seat belt at the time of the trial. Defendant thereby waived his right to
object to the same.

X^HEREFORE, Plaintiff Logan City prays Defendant's Motion to Arrest
Judgment be denied.
DATED this

3/

day of December, 1989.

C H E R W A . RUSSELL
LOGAN C m PROSECUTOR

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Sylvia Tlbbitts, secretary for the Logan City Attorneys Office,
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Defendant's^
Motion to Arrest Judgment to:
David Craig Carlsen
Defendant in Pro Se
78.5 North 100 East #1
Logan, Utah 84321
and
Arden W. Lauritzen
Attorney of record for David Craig Carlsen
326 North First East
P. 0. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321

Dated:/£-3/. £?

IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LOGAN CITY,
Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
CASE NO. 892008887CV
DAVID CARLSEN,
Defendant

TRIAL IN THE above referred
Jury

on

the

20th

day

of

to matter was held before a

December,

1989.

The

Jury

having

returned a verdict of guilty* and the Court having set the date
of January 30, 1990 for sentencing.

The Defendant has filed a

Motion for an Arrest of Judgment.

The Court after reviewing

said Motion and Plaintiff's response thereto finds that there
is

no

basis

upon

which

to

Arrest

Judgment

Defendant's Motion is hereby denied.
Dated this 11th day of January, 1990.
BY THE/C6I

Clint S.
Circuit Court

and

therefore

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
Defendant in Pro Se
78 h North 100 East, # 1
Logan, Utah 84 32]
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
-LOGAN CITY,
Plaintiff,
-vsDAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
Defendant.

;
: DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION
: FOR AN ARREST OF JUDGMENT
* :
;

Case No- 892008887

COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen
and hereby respectfully moves this Court for an Order to Arrest
Judgment in the above-entitled matter.
The basis for this motion is that the No Utah Registration
Statutes, U.C.A. § 41-1-18, § 41-1-19 (f), and § 41-1-1 (22),
(1953 as amended) does not give a clear definition for the term
of nonresident and fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice of the residency requirements imposed by said statutes
and therefore are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and the application of saicl statutes against
the defendant in this case deprived the defendant of Equal
Protection of the Laws and restricted his right to Freedom
of Travel as secured under the Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

DATED this 15th day of January, 1990.

'/farftf/

^^

DAVTS CRAIG C A R L S E N '

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MAILED a true a-nd correct copy of the foregoing Supplemental
Motion for an Arrest of Judgment and the Memorandum in Support
thereof to Cherl Russell, Logan City Prosecutor, located at 255
North Main, Logan, Utah, 8432], postage prepaid and by placing
the same in a U.S. Mailbox on this 15th day of January, 1990.

DAVID CRAIG CARLSfift ' J
-2-

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
Defendant in Pro Se
78 \ North 100 East, # ]
Logan, Utah 84321
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
LOGAN CITY,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

:
: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL
: MOTION FOR AN ARREST OF JUDGMENT

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
Defendant.

: Case No. 892008887

COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen,
and hereby respectfully submits the following Memorandum in
Support of his Supplemental Motion for an Arrest of Judgment:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen was tried
before this Court on a jury trial for the offense of No Utah
Registration on the 20th day of December, 1989.

The testimony

adduced at the trial shows that on the 8th day of August, 1989,
the defendant was operating a vehicle properly registered to him
in the State of Idaho.

The defendant testified that he considered

himself to be a resident of the State of Idaho and residing
in Preston, Idaho.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE NO UTAH REGISTRATION STATUTES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
It is well recognized in law that one may not be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed/"United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S.
612, (1954); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972); and Logan City v. Carlsen,'585 P.2d 449, cert, denied,
439 U.S. 1131 (1979).
The defendant in this case was charged by Information
for violating the provisions of U.C.A. § 41-1-18, (1953 as amended)
which provides as follows:
(1) It is a class B misdemeanor for any person to drive
or move or for an owner knowingly to permit to be driven
or moved upon any highway any vehicle of a type required
to be registered in this state:
The exceptions to the vehicles required to be registered
in the State of Utah is defined under the provisions of U.C.A.
§ 41-1-19, (1953 as amended) in which the pertinent parts states
as follows:

-2-

(1) Every motor vehicle, combination of vehicles, trailer,
and simitrailer, when driven or moved upon a highway, is
subject to the registration and certificate of title
provisions of this chapter except:
(f) any motor vehicle not designed, used, or maintained
for the transportation of passengers for hire or for the
transportation of property, if t, the vehicle is duly
registered in another state and is owned and operated
by a nonresident of this state;
At the trial in the instant case, the prosecutor during
discussions with the Court and defense counsel on instructing the
jury as to the term of nonresident claimed that the provisions of
U.C.A. § 41-2-102 (16), (1953 as amended) is the applicable
statute defining the terra of nonresident.

However, this statute

applies only to a Utah Operator's License and since the defendant
was not cited or charged by Information for not having a valid
Utah Driverfs License, the provisions of this statute was not
properly applied to the Motor Vehicle Act in the instant case.
The term of nonresident for the purposes of required
registration under the.Motor vehicle Act is defined under the
provisions of U.C.A. § 41-1-1# (1953 as amended) of which the
pertinent part states as follows:

-3-

(22) (a) "Nonresident" means every person who is not
a resident of this state and who does not engage in
intrastate business within this state and operate in
that business any motor vehicle, trailer, or simitrailer
within this state.
It is the defendant's contention that the Motor Vehicle
Act does not give a clear definition of the term, "Nonresident"
for required motor vehicle registration.

The legislature has

enacted statutes giving a cltear definition of residency requirements for the purposes of voter registration, U.C.A. § 20-2-13,
§ 20-2-14, (1953 as amended); for the purpose, student tuition
fees, U.C.A. § 53B-8-102, (1953 as amended); for the purpose
of receiving public assistance, U.C.A. § 62A-9-115, (1953 as amended);
and for the purpose of receiving a notarial commission, U.C.A.
§ 46-1-3, (1953 as amended).

However, the legislature under

the Motor Vehicle Act which imposes a criminal penalty has
failed to enact a statute which gives a clear definition of
the residency requirements for the purpose of motor vehicle
registrations.
It is clearly unfair that during discussions on instructing
the jury the Court, prosecutor and defense counsel could not
determine the proper residency requirements under the Motor

-4-

Vehicle Act and at the same time hold the defendant criminally
responsible for acts in which a person of ordinary intelligence
should have known to be proscribed by the statutes.

The statutes

under the Motor Vehicle Act are unconstitutionally vague in that
said statutes fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence,
fair notice of the residency requirements for the purpose of
motor vehicle registrations under such Act.
Furthermore, the application of U.C.A. § 41-2-302 (16),
(1953 as amended) against the defendant in this case subjected
him to arbitrary and invidious discrimination in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause and an infringement of his right to
freedom of travel in violation of the United States Constitution,
Barnett v. Lindsay, 319 F.Supp. 610 (D. Utah 1970).

DATED this 15th day of January, 1990.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
LOGAN CITY,
Plaintiff

]>
;)

vs.

;

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,

])

Defendant

]

PLAINTIFF'S MEMDPANDIM IN
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL M3TION FOR
AN ARREST OF JUDGMENT
No. 892008887

OCMES NOW Plaintiff by and through their attorney, Cheryl A. Russell,
Logan City Prosecutor, and responds to Defendant's Supplemental Motion for
Arrest of Judgment as follows:
1.

The court issued on January 11, 1990 a Memorandum Decision denying

Defendant's notion to arrest judgment.
2.

The statement of facts in Defendant's memorandum in support of

supplemental motion for an arrest of judgment conveniently leaves out the
undisputed fact the Defendant had a Utah driver's license; was working in the
State of Utah; and was living five days a week in Utah and going to Idaho on
weekends for 2 days. Plaintiff believes that the jury elected to believe
these facts over Defendant's testimony that he considered himself an Idaho
resident and. to be living in Preston, Idaho.
3.

At the time of trial, Defendant's attorney requested that an

instruction be given defining residency. The court as well as the
prosecution had no objection to such an instruction being given. Defendant's
counsel was then asked to offer a proposed instruction on the sane.
Defendant's counsel did not have a proposed instruction. So it was agreed to
use the definition of resident as set forth in Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended) Section 41-2-102(16).
4.

Furthermore, Defendant did not request that the definition alleged

to be set forth in Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) Section 41-1-19 be
given by the court at trial. This is raised for the first time in his
supplemental motion.

5.

The definition in Utah Cede Annotated (1952 as amended) Section

41-2-102(16) was appropriate urder the facts of this case since Defendant at
the time of the alleged offense had a Utah drivers license.
6.

Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) Section 41-1-19(f)

specifically provides the exception is only applicable "if the vehicle is
duly registered in another state and is owned and operated by a nonresident
of this state" (Utah).

Defendant was clearly a resident of Utah - he had a

Utah drivers license.
7.

Defendant for the first time in his supplemental motion raises the

issues of Due Process and Equal Protection. Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended) Section 41-1-1(22) sets forth the definition of residency.
Interestingly enough, neither the Defendant in his supplemental motion nor
his attorney requested that the terms thereof be used in the court's
instruction,
8.

Finally, Defendant's motion and memorandum fails to set forth how

Defendant was denied equal protection by alleged arbitrary and invidious
discrimination. Defendant has the burden on said issue.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests Defendant's supplemental motion to arrest
also be denied.
DATED this

day of January, 1990.

CHERYLS. RUSSELL
Logan City Prosecutor

IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LOGAN CITY,

Plaintiff

)

]
i

vs.

]

DAVID CARLSEN,

""Defendant

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

892008887CV

]

]

!

TRIAL ON THE above referred to matter was held before a
jury on the 20th day of 'December, 1989.
The Jury having
returned a verdict of guilty and the Court having set the date
of January 30, 1990 for sentencing.
The Defendant had
previously filed a Motion for an Arrest of Judgment which was
denied by Memorandum Decision dated January 11, 1990. The
Defendant has now filed a Supplemental Motion for an -Arrest of
Judgment and a Memorandum in support thereof. The basis for
Defendant's Motion is that the applicable Utah Statutes, (See
Section 41-1-18, 41-1-19 (f), and 41-1-1 (22) U.C.A.) does not
give a clear definition to the term of non-resident and fails
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the
residency requirements imposed by said Statutes and therefore
are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment and that the Defendant was
deprived of equal protection of the laws and restricted his
right to freedom of travel as secured under the Constitution
and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
The Court after reviewing said Supplemental Motion and

Logan City vs. David Carlson
#892008887
Page 2

Plaintiffs response thereto finds that there is no basis upon
which to Arrest Judgment and therefore Defendant's Motion is
hereby denied.
Dated this 25th day of January, 19!
'URT:

C]

Circuit

Judkins
ourt Judge

